Consensus kills demand.

If you ask seven people to approve a brand, you will get seven people's worth of brand. Each of them has a job, a quarter, a political consideration, and a memory of the last launch that failed. Each of them is trying to make sure their fingerprints aren't on the wrong decision.

The result is rarely catastrophic. It's worse than that. It's survivable. It clears the legal review. It clears the trade review. It clears the focus group. And it lands in market as exactly the thing a focus group would have predicted — which is to say, forgettable.

The seven-person problem.

Demand is created by sharpness. Sharpness, by definition, alienates someone. That's the deal. The brands that move the category don't do it by being agreed with; they do it by being chosen, which is a different thing. And consensus rooms are biased against being chosen, because being chosen requires being not-chosen first.

The brands that move the category aren't agreed with. They're chosen, which is a different thing.

What founders are actually paying for.

A founder who hires an outside operator is rarely paying for unfamiliar information. They have the information. What they're paying for is a partner willing to take a position that the rest of the room won't — and willing to defend it in front of the people who will lose status if it's right.

How to run a sharper review.

A few moves that help. Name the consensus pull before the meeting starts. If you can articulate what the cautious answer is going to be, you can choose whether to take it on its merits or because it's safe. Separate the strategic decision from the execution decision. Most committees can't say no to a strategy but will reflexively edit the execution into the middle. Decide strategy first, in a smaller room. Find your dissenter. Every room has one person who will say the uncomfortable thing. Brief them privately and ask them to say it.

What this looks like in practice.

The Miller Lite Canadian launch had a version where we hedged the category. It tested fine. We didn't run it. The version that ran was the one half the room thought was too direct — and it was the version that worked. The cautious version would not have failed loudly. It would have failed quietly, which is the worst kind.

If the brand strategy clears every meeting without friction, it will likely clear every shopper the same way.